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ABSTRACT 
By virtue of their economic influence, the Arab States of the Gulf are highly interlinked within 
the global community. Dimensions of globalization (such as outward looking focus on international 
trade, openness, growing business opportunities and investment) are shifting their interests to a broad 
spectrum of partners leading to increased connectivity platforms and links. Apparent deteriorating ties 
seriously undermines relations among GCC1 players and adversely affects its functioning. Current 
dispute, centered on allegations about Qatar’s foreign policy, caused much consternation, in fact, 
unequivocally conflicted with the interests of other members and escalated tensions. A scheme of 
prolonged economic isolation for the Gulf state of Qatar presents challenges and opportunities for 
Romania (particularly in food security initiatives in Qatar), however, in light of inter-regional 
realignments, a united GCC stance must consequently prevail to promote stability and reinforce its 
status of regional power in the Arab World, that would develop and maintain a strong bilateral 
relationship between Romania and the GCC.  
KEYWORDS: Gulf Cooperation Council, diplomatic crisis, trade, Romanian entities 
INTRODUCTION 
The official inauguration of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf 
referred to as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)2 took place in May 1981 in the midst of 
Iran-Iraq conflict with the Charter signed on the 25th of May in Abu Dhabi City, United Arab 
Emirates.3In some ways the GCC mirrors the European Union. Essentially there are two core 
intergovernmental bodies, a Supreme Council (consists of the six heads of the member states 
and summoned once per year) and a Ministerial Council (comprised of six foreign ministers 
which gather four times per year).4 
Qatar peninsula is about 11,586 sq. km and it connects to the mainland with eastern 
border of Saudi Arabia.5 Before falling under the control of the al Thani family in the mid-
nineteenth century, the present-day leadership of Bahrain (al Khalifa family) dominated parts 
1 (Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is a political and economic union currently consisting of Bahrain, Kuwait, 
Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) 
2 The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf Secretariat General, ‘The Charter of the GCC’ (2016), 
Article1, available at: http://www.gcc-sg.org/en-us/AboutGCC/Pages/Primarylaw.aspx (accessed on 7th February 
2017). 
3 Riccardo Dugulin, ‘A Neighborhood Policy for the Gulf Cooperation Council’ (Gulf Papers Series,Gulf 
Research Center, United Arab Emirates, 2010), p. 9. 
4 The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf Secretariat General, Organizational Structure, 2016, 
available at: http://www.gcc-sg.org/en-us/AboutGCC/Pages/OrganizationalStructure.aspx , (accessed on 12th 
July 2017). 
5Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), ‘World Fact Book: Middle East: Qatar’ available 
at:https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/qa.html  (accessed on 10th July, 2017). 
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of the Qatari peninsula. Both countries reasserted and claimed authority of the Hawar Islands 
and were confined under the territorial dispute until 2001 when the issue was settled and 
internationally recognized at the International Court of Justice.6 The longstanding border 
dispute between Saudi and Qatar which resulted in the 1992 clash preoccupied the ruling 
families in both countries for decades.7 Qatar’s rise to global prominence coincided with a 
new generation of leadership which embraced economic openness, astute strategy design and 
accelerated the development of its liquefied natural-gas infrastructure and long-term energy 
agreements with emerging economies worldwide.8 The Qatari foreign policy and diplomatic 
moves with the new rule of Shaikh Tamim bin Hamad al Thani from June 20139 involved the 
desire of consolidating national interests however not necessarily in coordination or mutual 
agreement or policy consistent with the other GCC member states.10 There are a number of 
factors from local, regional and international that appears to have contribute to the shift in 
Qatar’s more independent position. Viewed through a lens of predominant realist approach 
‘the realists assume that the real issues of international politics can be understood by the 
rational analysis of competing interests defined in terms of power’.11 At the same time Qatar 
strengthen its alliance with the US and the partnership with the GCC members however, it is 
also on good terms with regional rivals such as Iran to the detriment of its diplomatic relations 
with its neighbours.12 
The Gulf monarchies were unable to prevent the crisis or the conflict scenario from 
emerging and the 37 years old alliance was impacted to the extent that it caused rupture of 
diplomatic ties between United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia (KSA), Bahrain, Egypt 
and Qatar on Monday 5th of June 2017. Under the move, Saudi Arabia closed its borders with 
Qatar and blocked access and contacts (land, sea and air) for respective Qatar routes.13With 
the exception of Oman and Kuwait, other countries joined the Saudi’s positions against 
Qatar’s open-door policy towards political actors in the region and the rift appeared to be 
widening (Yemen, Egypt, Libya, Mauritius, Maldives, Senegal, United Nations of Comoros 
and Mauritania also cut diplomatic ties with Qatar while Jordan, Chad, Djibouti, Niger 
downgraded diplomatic ties). The two remaining GCC member states, Kuwait and Oman, less 
interventionist, have not announced their stance on the rift and have been trying to mediate 
between all parties. The collapse in the relation with the GCC also resulted in the formation of 
the Saudi-UAE committee announced at the GCC summit in Kuwait City attempting to 
represent an alternative vis-à-vis the GCC bloc.14 
According to public debate, the Qatar’s crisis and country’s distinctive approach to 
regional affairs has several components that grown intertwined as Qatar became more 
independent in regional and international relations. Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, 
Bahrain and Egypt charged Doha of extending financial support and dedicating resources for 
6Krista E. Wiegand, ‘Bahrain, Qatar, and the Hawar Islands: Resolution of a Gulf Territorial Dispute’  
(2012) Middle East Journal 66, pp. 79-96. 
7 The New York Times, ‘Qatar Says Saudis Seized Its Border Post’, (News Article, 2nd October, 1992) available 
at: http://www.nytimes.com/1992/10/02/world/qatar-says-saudis-seized-its-border-post.html, (accessed on 12th 
July 2017). 
8LinaKhatib, ‘Qatar’s foreign policy: The limits of pragmatism’, (2013) International Affairs 89, pp. 417-413. 
9 Ian Black, ‘Qatar’s emir Sheikh Haman to had power to son, crown prince Tamim’ (The Guardian, 24 th June, 
2013) available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/24/qatar-emir-steps-down-son-tamim (accessed 
on 6th December 2017). 
10LinaKhatib, ‘Qatar’s foreign policy: The limits of pragmatism’, (2013) International Affairs 89, pp. 417-413. 
11 Jack Donnelly, Realism in International Relations (Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom, 2000) p. 7.  
12LinaKhatib, ‘Qatar’s foreign policy: The limits of pragmatism’, (2013) International Affairs 89, p. 418. 
13 Patrick Wintour, ‘Gulf plunged into diplomatic crisis as countries cut ties with Qatar’ (News Article, The 
Guardian, 5th June, 2017) available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/05/saudi-arabia-and-
bahrain-break-diplomatic-ties-with-qatar-over-terrorism(accessed on 7th June 2017). 
14 Patrick Wintour, ‘UAE announces new Saudi Alliance that could reshape Gulf relations’ (The Guardian, 5 th 
December, 2017) available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/05/uae-saudi-arabia-alliance-gulf-
relations-gcc (accessed on 7th December 2017). 
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high profile Islamist groups that emerged to disrupt the balance in the region and, Al Jazeera, 
the Doha based broadcaster was being used as a platform and instrument for such groups with 
a far reaching, impact given its new dynamic of engagement.15There have been minor 
sporadic diplomatic breakdowns between the countries, but another worrisome crisis broke 
out in 2014.Once again old emerging issues and past differences have blown up over border 
demarcation and the four capitals escalated a trend of bilateral disengagement and judged that 
the leadership in Doha has repeatedly failed to meet its promises and was not in full 
compliance with the agreements and written obligations to the GCC signed in 2014.16 
Subsequent to withdrawing diplomatic ties, a series of measures against Qatar severely 
impacted the movement of people with a number of airlines announcing flight cancellations 
to/from Doha. UAE based airlines Etihad Airways, Emirates, AirArabia, Flydubai andRoyal 
Jet suspended service to of Qatar effective June 6th 2017. Saudi Arabia, UAE and Bahrain 
took measures against Qatar by issuing a ban for nationals to travel the country, and taking 
the decision to expel Qatari nationals. Subsequently, Qatar Airways, the state-owned flag 
carrier of the state Qatar suspended all flights to Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain and Egypt.17 
Banning of Qatar Airway flights from UAE, Saudi and Bahrain airspace resulted in 
significant delays and flight cancellations. The flight cancellations primarily impacted those 
who fly to and from the UAE and Qatar regularly due to work commitments increasing 
duration and cost given that longer routes through Kuwait and Oman had to be considered. 
The restriction of movement had serious implications for commercial entities in relation to 
set-up and servicing the rest of the Gulf monarchies as most of the financial institutions, 
consultancies and food consolidators historically set up in the UAE as a gateway due to the 
developed infrastructure and access. Qatar’s has managed to increase its international prestige 
and casted an image of beneficial business climate. Large corporations are adapting to the 
change by setting up a presence in Doha, however small and medium-sized businesses are 
finding hard to maintain commercial relations with Qatar while the GCC dispute remains due 
to limited budgets and requirements to deliver projects on schedule.  
Qatar is the third largest projects’ market (USD$228.4 Billion planned or under 
construction)18 in the GCC after Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, 
with project companies already feeling the effect of slowdown in activity in 2016/2017. 
Imposing economic sanctions and closing vital land border with Saudi Arabia will affect 
Qatar’s imports including food. The Gulf monarchy is heavily dependent on food imports and 
construction materials leading to disruptions that may significantly affect the country.19Since 
the crisis began Qatar continued to prioritize food security strategies and invested in food 
security facilities and warehouses making it better positioned to serve its domestic needs.20 
15 Patrick Wintour, ‘Qatar diplomatic crisis – what you need to know’ (The Guardian, 5th June, 2017) available 
at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/05/qatar-diplomatic-crisis-what-you-need-to-know (accessed 
on 7th June 2017). 
16 The National, ‘Revealed: the secret pledges Qatar made — and then broke. Formerly secret documents show 
commitments Doha made to fellow Arab countries in 2013 and 2014’ (News Article, 11th July 2017) available 
at:https://www.thenational.ae/world/gcc/revealed-the-secret-pledges-qatar-made-and-then-broke-1.484155 
(accessed on 12th July 2017). 
17 Paul Crompton, ‘How the Qatari crisis affects you’, (Gulf News, 5th June, 2017) available at: 
http://gulfnews.com/news/uae/general/how-the-qatari-crisis-affects-you-1.2038738(accessed on 7th June 2017). 
18Ventures Onsite, ‘Qatar Constructions Industry 2017’ (Report, May 2017) available at: 
http://www.projectqatar.com/pdf/Qatar%20Construction%202017.pdf(accessed on 25th June 2017). 
19 Adams Taylor, ‘Qatar could face a food crisis in spat with Arab neighbors’ (The Washington Post, 5th June, 
2017) available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/06/05/qatar-could-face-a-food-
crisis-in-spat-with-arab-neighbors/?utm_term=.b5b8a644b52b (accessed on 10th June 2017). 
20IrfanBukhari, ‘QR 1.6bn food security project launched’ (The Peninsula, 17 th July 2017) available at: 
https://www.thepeninsulaqatar.com/article/17/07/2017/QR1.6bn-food-security-project-launched accessed on 2nd 
December 2017. 
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Qatar imports 90% of its food supplies21 and 40% enters the country from Abu Samra, 
the only Saudi – Qatari land border crossing. In the short to medium term, Qatar will become 
reliant on air and sea freight with suppliers already connected through Qatar Airways.Turkey, 
Morocco, Lebanon and Iran already attempted to address shortages in water, meat, sugar and 
vegetables supplies and sent fresh produce to Qatar via air freight.22 The rerouting of trade 
will raise the cost of imports and pass-through to consumer inflation and prompts 
entitiesdoing business with Qatar to essentially plan for operational disruptions and seek legal 
advice to assess existing contractual terms. The impact caused by the disruption to the flow of 
goods and people by air, land, or sea, could trigger severe implications causing rapid 
economic dislocation and leading to social or political unrest.  
Romanians in the region are no longer able to travel directly to Qatar from the UAE, 
Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. Romanians in managerial positions with regional responsibilities 
will find it difficult to meet with potential leads and achieve relevant sales and engagement 
targets due to this disruption. It is estimated that the current travel restrictions will remain in 
place for the coming month impacting on Qatar tourism, industry, aviation - all relevant for 
Romanian professionals doing work in the region. In addition, this instability has a tendency 
to reduce the influx of Romanians to the region due to media coverage that may place 
inaccurate information and leads to departures as a result of perceived threats.   
By all accounts, Qatar remains confident in their economic prospects and signed a 
transportation agreement and a bilateral deal in the field of engineering with Turkey and Iran 
to speed up the movement and exchanges of goods and to ease economic pressure by the GCC 
states.23 Despite the fact that Qatar has ensured uninterrupted food supplies we must not 
overlook the disturbing tendency and adverse impacts of the diplomatic crisis and the related 
consequences for food security, the vast bulk of its food is imported and the sanctions have 
halted transport of foodstuff and disrupted shipping routes.  
This crisis presents challenges and opportunities for Romanian entities. The main 
challenge revolves around logistical requirements, transport, shipping and freight. Romanian 
exporters will face increased costs for exporting their products to Qatar due to increase time 
of shipping through Oman and Kuwait as most of the large shipping lines only ship to United 
Arab Emirates (Jabel Ali). Smaller vessels depart the UAE loaded with products to other 
GCC countries. However, the crisis also leads to opportunities for Romanian exporters 
especially in the food and agriculture sector given Qatar’s high level of food import 
dependency therefore Romanian food exporters may provide a direct channel for the Qatari 
market in areas such as fresh food, meat, proteins and grains. 
Bilateral trade between Romania and Qatar outlined an ascending trend with a relative 
dominance of food, furniture, clothing, chemicals, materials, plastic products, machinery, 
industrial equipment and imports from Qatar include oil and petrochemicals. Romanian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs revealed a total trade figure between the two nations of $US 56.88 
million for 2015.24 In additions, the existence of eighteen bilateral agreements between 
Romania and Qatar provide the required foundation to consolidate and further cement the 
bilateral relationship.25 
21Oxford Business Group, ‘Report: Qatar 2015’ (Report, 2015). 
22 Jason Neely and Mark Potter, ‘Iran flies food to Qatar amid concerns of shortages’ (Reuters, 11th June, 2017) 
available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gulf-qatar-iran-idUSKBN1920EG?il=0 (accessed on 14th June 
2017). 
23 Jim Carey, ‘Iran, Turkey, and Qatar sign Major Transportation Deal to Boost Trade’ (Geopolitics Alert, 26 th 
November 2017) available at: http://geopoliticsalert.com/iran-turkey-qatar-transportation-deal accessed on 4th
December 2017. 
24 Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bilateral Relations with the State of Qatar (Department of Middle East 
and North Africa, Bucharest, February 2016) available at: https://www.mae.ro/bilateral-relations/1785#782 
(accessed December 4th, 2017). 
25Ibidem, 
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A potential challenge faced by all entities in the region and exporters may be related to 
the payment for relevant projects in Qatar and the impact of potential financial sanctions 
imposed by the GCC in dealing with Qatar. In addition to reduced regional trade, Saudi 
Arabia’s central bank advised banks in the kingdom to hold off on deals with Qatari banks. 
Similarly, UAE, Bahrain and Egypt’s local banks received instructions to limit transactions, 
delay business with Doha and report their exposure to Qatari banks. Qatar has enough 
financial power to protect its banks and provide liquidity given its massive SWF estimated at 
US $320 billion26 however, given Qatar’s integration with regional counterparts combined 
with lower confidence levels, foreign business links may be intensely impacted.27 Romanian 
entities planning for business and operational disruptions will incur additional costs that were 
not originally stipulated in contracts and business agreements. The challenge for Romania is 
to maintain a competitive edge whilst factoring risk management and costs as a result of the 
blockade. 
Kuwait has played an unmatchable big brother role in restoring balance and narrowing 
the gaps between the crisis-affected countries. In past disputes which engulfed Qatar, Kuwait 
was recognised as virtually the key contributor, a fundamental intermediary and played 
essential roles to assuage consequences of dissention.28 Its leadership facilitated dialog and 
conciliation and pursued mitigation in a way that resonated with all sides. The present 
predicament is still in its early stages however, as in previous times, the success of mediation 
is yet to be seen given that these countries rejected Qatar’s response to their demands as of 
12th July 2017. A negotiation route out of the rift will work if it considers diverging interests 
of the concerned parties and resonates with local cultural nuances and norms. 
In the Middle East North Africa region, the GCC bloc emerged as an organization 
with effective dispute resolution functions, a competent force from a regional security role 
and the main forum for the conduct of collective diplomacy by its member states thus, on the 
political front that provided Romania with a clear and well-defined engagement plan across 
the GCC region. The diplomatic crisis will open new avenues for foreign players in Europe 
and the Middle East to be involved in the political, economic and social streams in the Gulf 
monarchies. In long term, however, the uncertainty and the shifting of allegiances in some 
instances are bound to create additional political tensions, all of this, in turn leaves little room 
for Romania to manage and consolidate the key relationships in the region it wishes to pursue. 
CONCLUSION 
The current GCC diplomatic split is damaging for all parties involved and in particular 
for foreign countries like Romania, trying to navigate the political and economic sphere in the 
GCC. The estimation of the economic costs (around $US 1 Billion including loss of projects 
for companies and investments) is an essential first step for reversing the damage caused by 
the recent dispute between Qatar and the other Arab state actors. Gulf-based power structures 
are embedded with glaring manifestations of tribalism, rigid cultural conceptions and pride. 
Besides, their identities are defined by inherent patrilineal networks, the role of Islam, 
26 Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, Sovereign Wealth Fund Rankings, available at: 
http://www.swfinstitute.org/sovereign-wealth-fund-rankings/ (accessed on 12th July, 2017). 
27 Tom Arnold and SaeedAzhar, ‘UAE blacklist may squeeze liquidity of Qatari banks. The move followed the 
isolation of Qatar by the four states’ (News Article, Business Standard, 10th June, 2017) available at: 
http://www.business-standard.com/article/international/uae-blacklist-may-squeeze-liquidity-of-qatari-banks-
117061000737_1.html (accessed on 11th July, 2017). 
28Naser Al Wasmi, ‘Kuwait faces tough test as it struggles to resolve Qatar crisis. Country has become the 
peacemaker of choice in the fractious dispute between Doha and its neighbours’, (The National, 5th July 2017) 
available at: https://www.thenational.ae/world/kuwait-faces-tough-test-as-it-struggles-to-resolve-qatar-crisis-
1.91724 (accessed on 5th July, 2017). 
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increasingly diverse domestic politics and conflicting foreign policy approaches which 
enabled different national level politics. Hence, only in line with sufficient understanding of 
this pertinent background, the architecture of international relations and the compelling 
processes at work in the GCC states a more broad-based approach can be contemplated and 
truly increase connectivity platforms and links.  
Romania’s ability and willingness to engage directly with Qatar as evidenced by a 
number of high level visits, bilateral agreements and trade exchanges appears to remain solid 
and may provide further opportunities and pave the way for new Romanian entities and 
presence in the region. The emerging trend in engagement between Qatar and Romania and 
interest in the region favors the consolidations of bilateral ties. Expanding Romania Qatar 
relations may also signal stronger economic and investment gains. In turn, Romania has to 
recognize that engagement in the Gulf is a multi-dimensional phenomenon and must balance 
its relationships and commercial interests for Romanian entities in United Arab Emirates and 
Saudi Arabia. High level visits across the region by Romanian officials must continue with all 
relevant stakeholders because despite the diplomatic rift, the GCC remains a substantial 
integrated bloc with a shared history of achievements and challenges that are usually 
overcome. 
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